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Olmstead as a Tool for Decarceration
Sarah Kahn*
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring established that the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990’s integrated-care mandate requires the government to
make reasonable accommodations to protect the right of people with disabilities to
live in the most integrated setting possible. In response, counties began releasing
people from restrictive mental-health institutions but did not provide the necessary
resources, such as supportive housing and outpatient care, to allow people to live
successfully in their communities. As many people contending with disabilities were
left homeless and the United States increased its reliance on incarceration,
shuttered mental-health institutions gave way to jails and prisons. Olmstead
litigation focused on decarceration could establish counties’ legal obligation to
release eligible people from jails and prisons and to provide them with
mental-health care in their communities.

* Sarah Kahn is a J.D. candidate at UCI School of Law, Class of 2021, a finalist for the PSJD Pro Bono
Publico Award, and a 2021 Justice Catalyst Fellow with the ACLU of Southern California.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States fails to provide mental-health care and housing to residents,
instead relying on punitive carceral responses to social justice issues. Often, the law
enforcement officer arresting a person during a mental-health crisis—rather than a
social worker or mental-health professional—is the first county employee to
interact with the person in crisis.1 This overreliance on criminalization instead of
treatment as a response to public-health crises disproportionately affects people of
color, who are more likely to be arrested, charged, and murdered by
law enforcement.2
1. Jailing People with Mental Illness, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/
Advocacy/Policy-Priorities/Divert-from-Justice-Involvement/Jailing-People-with-Mental-Illness
[ http://web.archive.org/web/20200422024053/https://www.nami.org/Advocacy/Policy-Priorities/
Divert-from-Justice-Involvement/Jailing-People-with-Mental-Illness] (last visited July 8, 2021) (“In a
mental health crisis, people are more likely to encounter police than get medical help. As a result, 2
million people with mental illness are booked into jails each year. Nearly 15% of men and 30% of
women booked into jails have a serious mental health condition.”).
2. Radley Balko, Opinion, There’s Overwhelming Evidence that the Criminal Justice System is
Racist. Here’s the Proof, WASH. POST ( June 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/
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In Are Prisons Obsolete?, Angela Davis writes that the “collective imagination[ ]
fantasize[s incarcerated people] as people of color. The prison therefore functions
ideologically as an abstract site into which undesirables are deposited, relieving us
of the responsibility of thinking about the real issues afflicting those communities.”3
Instead of investing in the housing and mental-health care that could prevent crises
or investing in non-law-enforcement crisis response teams, many communities are
pouring more and more funding into jails that are left trying to contend with the
increasing mental-health needs of the communities’ populations.4 The landmark
disability rights case Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring5 could provide civil rights
attorneys with a legal tool to advocate for shifting mental-health treatment out of
jails and into community-based services.
I. MENTAL HEALTH AND JAILS
A. America’s Mental-Health Crisis and Carceral Response
A 2018 study found that America is facing a rapidly growing mental-health
crisis rooted in the lack of access to mental-health care and community services.6
After closing many of the cruelest and most restrictive mental institutions in the
1960s, the United States failed to build community-based alternatives such as
supportive housing, outpatient mental-health care, and peer support.7 In the same
years during which many mental institutions were shut down and federal funding
for public mental-health care was slashed, the “war on drugs” was invented, and

2020/opinions/systemic-racism-police-evidence-criminal-justice-system/ [ https://perma.cc/EW7WAGBF] (“[W]e have systems and institutions that produce racially disparate outcomes, regardless of
the intentions of the people who work within them . . . . Stop-and-frisk data, for example, consistently
show that about 3 percent of these encounters produce any evidence of a crime . . . . A massive
study published in May 2020 of 95 million traffic stops by 56 police agencies between 2011 and 2018
found that while black people were much more likely to be pulled over than whites, the disparity lessens
at night, when police are less able to distinguish the race of the driver. The study also found that blacks
were more likely to be searched after a stop, though whites were more likely to be found with
illicit drugs.”).
3. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 16 (2003).
4. At both the local and national levels, America invests heavily in law enforcement and
incarceration while underfunding social-support services including housing and mental health care. See
Annie Lowrey, Defund the Police: America Needs to Rethink its Priorities for the Whole Criminal-Justice
System, ATLANTIC ( June 5, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/defundpolice/612682/ [ https://perma.cc/8YQL-UA5J ].
5. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
6. COHENS VETERANS NETWORK & NAT’L COUNCIL FOR BEHAV. HEALTH, AMERICA’S
MENTAL HEALTH 2018 4 (2018), https://www.cohenveteransnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/10/Research-Summary-10-10-2018.pdf [ https://perma.cc/A92Q-3JRB ].
7. See Jessica Placzek, Did the Emptying of Mental Hospitals Contribute to Homelessness?,
KQED: THE CAL. REP. (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.kqed.org/news/11209729/did-the-emptying-ofmental-hospitals-contribute-to-homelessness-here [ https://perma.cc/P4B9-XDPY ]; see also Eric
Westervelt & Liz Baker, America’s Mental Health Crisis Hidden Behind Bars, NPR: MORNING EDITION
(Feb. 25, 2020, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/02/25/805469776/americas-mental-healthcrisis-hidden-behind-bars [ https://perma.cc/EP24-DXXM ].
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with it came the increasing criminalization of financial and mental-health statuses.8
This “perfect storm of failed [federal] policies” forced millions of people suffering
with mental illness into jails and prisons.9 Today, the three largest county institutions
providing mental-health treatment in the country are the Los Angeles County Jail
in California, Cook County Jail in Illinois, and Rikers Island Jail in New York.10
Law enforcement officers have increasingly become first responders to
mental-health crises, and between a third to a half of people killed by police officers
have a disability.11 This disproportionately affects Black people, Indigenous people,
and people of color (BIPOC), who are more likely to be targeted and arrested or
killed by police.12 Disability discrimination has become a weapon of systemic racism
and a justification for violence enacted against BIPOC victims.
People with disabilities are at a higher risk of incarceration, but incarceration
is deeply harmful to mental health recovery. During “recreation time” in Los
Angeles, the county jail handcuffs and chains people placed in their mental-health
unit to the metal tables bolted to the floor.13 Tim Belavich, the Director of Mental
Health for the Los Angeles County jail system, says, “By default, we have become
the largest treatment facility in the country. And we’re a jail[.] . . . I would say a jail
facility is not the appropriate place to treat someone’s mental illness.”14 Yet sheriff
departments suggest solving this crisis by investing more in the carceral system
rather than investing in the community care and housing that could keep people
from ever encountering law enforcement.
8. Westervelt & Baker, supra note 7. The war on drugs was a campaign led by President Nixon
to control drug use. It relied on criminalization of drug use and substance use disorder. Id.
9.
Id.
10. Id.
11. DAVID M. PERRY & LAWRENCE CARTER-LONG, THE RUDERMAN WHITE PAPER ON
MEDIA COVERAGE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF FORCE AND DISABILITY 1 (2016), https://
rudermanfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/MediaStudy-PoliceDisability_final-final.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/R7GK-WKEU ].
12. Rashawn Ray, What Does the Shooting of Leonard Shand Tell Us About the Mental Health of
Civilians and Police?, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/howwe-rise/2019/10/16/what-does-the-shooting-of-leonard-shand-tell-us-about-the-mental-health-ofcivilians-and-police [ https://perma.cc/3P2R-XT55 ] (“People living with mental illness are more likely
to experience use of force and be victims of officer-involved shootings. Yet, racial/ethnic minorities
and low-income individuals are less likely to be diagnosed with a mental illness. Thus, their behavior
may be categorized as noncompliance when it is actually about mental health.”); see also DORIS
A. FULLER, H. RICHARD LAMB, MICHAEL BIASOTTI & JOHN SNOOK, TREATMENT ADVOCACY
CENTER, OVERLOOKED IN THE UNDERCOUNTED: THE ROLE OF MENTAL ILLNESS IN FATAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT ENCOUNTERS 1 (2015), https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/
documents/overlooked-in-the-undercounted.pdf [ https://perma.cc/NC2A-7LMS] (“[T]he risk of
being killed during a police incident is 16 times greater for individuals with untreated mental illness than
for other civilians approached or stopped by officers.” (emphasis added)); Stuart M. Butler & Nehath Sheriff,
Innovative Solutions to Address the Mental Health Crisis: Shifting Away from Police as First Responders,
BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/innovative-solutionsto-address-the-mental-health-crisis-shifting-away-from-police-as-first-responders [ https://perma.cc/
485W-EHCA ].
13. Westervelt & Baker, supra note 7.
14. Id.
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In neighboring Orange County, Sheriff Don Barnes has stated that “the
Orange County jail has become the de facto mental hospital of Orange County,”
and has requested and received annual budget increases for jail mental-health care
while the social-services budget has shrunk each year.15 From 2010 to 2020, the
Orange County Board of Supervisors more than doubled the Orange County
Sheriff’s Department’s budget (from $92 million to $198 million) and reduced the
Orange County Health Care Agency budget by $18 million and the Social Services
Agency budget by $12 million in the same time span.16 Around forty percent of
people incarcerated in Orange County’s jails have serious mental-health needs.17
Instead of investing more in community alternatives,18 Orange County is expanding
the currently empty James A. Musick Facility, adding almost 900 new beds and
making available over 2,000 beds to the county’s jail capacity.19 Hundreds of these
new beds will be reserved for people with mental-health needs, and funding for
these beds will come from state funding meant to support expansions with a focus
on treatment and programming for incarcerated people.20
Orange County and Los Angeles are not alone. As community activists call for
more community-based mental-health care and housing, many counties are
investing in expensive construction of “mental health jails.”21

15. Nick Gerda, OC Mental Health Jail Expansion Draws Pushback and Debate, VOICE OC
(Dec. 8, 2020), https://voiceofoc.org/2019/10/oc-mental-health-jail-expansion-draws-pushbackand-debate [ https://perma.cc/2BVZ-LM2R ] [ hereinafter Gerda, OC Mental Health Jail Expansion
Draws Pushback and Debate ]; Nick Gerda, OC Shifted Millions from Public Health in Last Decade While
Doubling Sheriff Spending, VOICE OC (Dec. 8, 2020), https://voiceofoc.org/2020/06/oc-shiftedmillions-from-public-health-in-last-decade-while-doubling-sheriff-spending
[ https://perma.cc/
5KRD-3YMY ].
16. Gerda, OC Mental Health Jail Expansion Draws Pushback and Debate, supra note 15.
17. Jail Profile Survey, CA.GOV: BSCC CAL., https://www.bscc.ca.gov/s_fsojailprofilesurvey/
[ https://perma.cc/NY5W-6FXH ] (June 15, 2021) (click “View Link” next to “Jail Profile Survey
Query”; select “Monthly” under “Facility” and click continue; select date range; select one or more
jurisdictions; hold control key and select “New mental health cases opened during this month” and
“(ADP totals) Jurisdiction”; click “query”).
18. See generally EVE GARROW & JULIA DEVANTHÉRY, ACLU, “THIS PLACE IS SLOWLY
KILLING ME.”: ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN ORANGE COUNTY EMERGENCY SHELTERS (2019),
https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/aclu_socal_oc_shelters_report.pdf
[ https://perma
.cc/UM9U-PGXR ] (detailing the neglect, abuse, harassment, and squalid conditions in Orange
County’s few available emergency shelters, which do not provide permanent housing solutions and do
not have space for everyone who needs housing in Orange County).
19. Alma Fausto, OC Supervisors Award $261 Million Contract for Musick Jail Expansion,
ORANGE CNTY. REG. (May 5, 2020, 4:20 PM), https://www.ocregister.com/2020/05/05/ocsupervisors-award-261-million-contract-for-musick-jail-expansion/ [ https://perma.cc/79JD-E87J ].
20. Gerda, OC Mental Health Jail Expansion Draws Pushback and Debate, supra note 15; Fausto,
supra note 19.
21.
See, e.g., Daily News, Opinion, A Mental Health Jail is an Oxymoron; Diversion is What’s
Needed: Guest Commentary, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.dailynews.com/2014/
06/24/a-mental-health-jail-is-an-oxymoron-diversion-is-whats-needed-guest-commentary [ https://
perma.cc/K6ET-CPVD ]; Westervelt & Baker, supra note 7.
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B. Psychological Research Shows that People Can’t Get Well in a Cell
The construction of “mental health jails” increases the number of people who
are incarcerated but fails to improve the care available to incarcerated people. While
there is no single definition of a “mental health jail,” the phrase refers to jail facilities
intended to house an incarcerated population struggling with mental illness.22 There
are no established standards for such a jail or how it could serve people with
mental-health diagnoses, but counties often justify jail expansion—and access state
funding reserved for improving treatment in jails—by calling a proposed jail a
“mental health jail.”23 Money is poured into jail construction instead of hiring new
psychologists to treat incarcerated people, improving conditions in existing jails, or
funding community-based treatment and housing. Even if minor improvements to
mental-health staffing could be achieved, effective mental-health treatment in jails
is thwarted by the violent, traumatic, and punitive nature of jails. No amount of
funding can turn a jail, which is fundamentally punitive, into a therapeutic setting.
The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services outlines four key components to
mental-health recovery, each of which is made impossible by incarceration.24 The
first is Health: “Overcoming or managing one’s disease(s) or symptoms . . . [and]
making informed, healthy choices that support physical and emotional wellbeing.”25
Developing healthy coping mechanisms and decision-making skills requires the
availability of choice. Every moment of an incarcerated person’s life—from sleeping
patterns, to eating choices, to interacting with others—is controlled by the jail.
Incarcerated people are denied the basic autonomy and agency necessary for
mental-health recovery.
22. See, e.g., STEPHANIE BROOKS HOLLIDAY, NICHOLAS M. PACE, NEIL GOWENSMITH, IRA
PACKER, DANIEL MURRIE, ALICIA VIRANI, BING HAN & SARAH B. HUNTER, RAND
CORP., ESTIMATING THE SIZE OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY JAIL MENTAL HEALTH POPULATION
APPROPRIATE FOR RELEASE INTO COMMUNITY SERVICES 4 (2020), https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR4328.html [ https://perma.cc/EBN3-GD79 ].
23. See Agenda State Report, ORANGE CNTY. BD. SUPERVISORS (May 5, 2020), http://
cams.ocgov.com/Web_Publisher/Agenda05_05_2020_files/images/A19-000745.HTM
[ https://
perma.cc/BQX3-R2VY ]; Editor, The OC Sheriff is Dumping ICE to Focus on Increasing Mental Health
Services, NEW SANTA ANA (Mar. 27, 2019), https://newsantaana.com/the-oc-sheriff-is-dumping-iceto-focus-on-increasing-mental-health-services/ [ https://perma.cc/PPT3-ABLN ] (discussing how
Orange County Sheriff-Coroner Don Barnes accessed $80,000,000 from CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 15820.925 (SB 1022), which authorizes state funding for program and treatment space for jails. Barnes
justified using money intended for treatment space to build new jail beds by pointing to the recent forty
percent increase in mental health cases in the Orange County jails. He told New Santa Ana Blog that
the Orange County Sheriff’s Department needed to “‘focus on enhancing our mental health services
and expanding the number of beds available for individuals with mental health needs.’” He did not
explain why adding additional beds, rather than improving or adding treatment and programs for people
already in existing beds, would help address this mental health crisis).
24. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., SAMHSA’S WORKING DEFINITION OF RECOVERY 3 (2012), https://
store.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/d7/priv/pep12-recdef.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/949T-TFDH ]
[ hereinafter SAMHSA’S WORKING DEFINITION OF RECOVERY ].
25. Id.
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The second is Home: having “[a] stable and safe place to live.”26 Incarcerated
people with mental illness live in constant fear and are uniquely vulnerable to
harassment, abuse, and assault by other incarcerated people and jail staff.27
Incarceration is mentally and emotionally traumatizing, violent, and stressful.28
The third is Purpose: conducting “[m]eaningful daily activities . . . [and having]
the independence, income and resources to participate in society.”29 Incarcerated
people cannot work in their community, volunteer, or contribute to their families;
for those who are able to make any money while incarcerated—an opportunity
sometimes afforded people in prisons but rarely offered in jails—wages are usually
less than a dollar (on average between fourteen and sixty-three cents for
non-industry jobs) per hour, and in eight states, prison labor is unpaid for in
government-run facilities.30 This means that an eight-hour work day in a California
prison might result in a total pay of $2.96, while a single fifteen-minute call home
from jail can cost up to $17.80, depending on the facility.31 Incarcerated people are
denied the independence and opportunity to participate in society necessary for
mental-health recovery. Without meaningful access to education or career
advancement, there is little opportunity to experience successes or to build or even
imagine a future.
The final component is Community: having “[r]elationships and social
networks that provide support, friendship, love, and hope.”32 Incarceration is
isolating and alienating. Incarcerated people are cut off from loved ones, whom they
26. Id.
27. Cynthia L. Blitz, Nancy Wolff & Jing Shi, Physical Victimization in Prison: The Role of Mental
Illness, 31 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 385, 385 (2008) (“Rates of physical victimization for males with
any mental disorder were 1.6 times (inmate-on-inmate) and 1.2 times (staff-on-inmate) higher than that
of males with no mental disorder. Female inmates with mental disorder were 1.7 times more likely to
report being physically victimized by another inmate than did their counterparts with no
mental disorder.”).
28. See, e.g., Voices from Solitary, Voices from Solitary: On Suicide Watch, SOLITARY WATCH
(Apr. 17, 2019), https://solitarywatch.org/2019/04/17/voices-from-solitary-on-suicide-watch
[ https://perma.cc/5KGL-B44M ] (“People on ‘suicide watch’ are typically held in a bare ‘strip cell,’
removed from social interactions and usually without basic furnishings, hygienic items, or clothing
beyond a ‘suicide smock.’ Some strip cells contain holes in the floor rather than toilets. This method of
isolating people on suicide watch has been widely implemented in prisons across the country, under the
rationale that suicides will be prevented by blocking access to anything that may be contrived to aid
suicidal actions. Suicide watch in many cases becomes a substitute for mental health treatment, and has
received criticism not only for its cruelty but also for its inefficacy.”).
29. SAMHSA’S WORKING DEFINITION OF RECOVERY, supra note 24.
30. Wendy Sawyer, How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn in Each State?, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Apr.
10,
2017),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages
[ https://perma.cc/R5PL-83UQ ]; Daniel Moritz-Rabson, ‘Prison Slavery’: Inmates Are Paid Cents
While Manufacturing Products Sold to Government, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 28, 2018, 5:12 PM), https://
www.newsweek.com/prison-slavery-who-benefits-cheap-inmate-labor-1093729 [ https://perma.cc/
28NG-NHBK ].
31. Peter Wagner & Alexi Jones, State of Phone Justice: Local Jails, State Prisons and Private
Phone Providers, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Feb. 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/
state_of_phone_justice.html [ https://perma.cc/Y6MU-VF65 ].
32. SAMHSA’S WORKING DEFINITION OF RECOVERY, supra note 24.
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can only see through glass once a week or less during brief jail visits and not at all
during suspended visitation, such as during a pandemic. Incarcerated people often
lose relationships while inside and struggle to rebuild them after they are released.33
Mental-health advocates have recognized that incarceration is antithetical to
mental-health recovery. The National Alliance on Mental Illness states that
individuals with mental illness get worse, not better, in jails.34 A criminal record
makes it difficult to get needed help, treatment, housing, and jobs after people are
released: Californians with criminal records face over 4,800 laws that impose
restrictions on their freedom to participate in professional fields, live in certain
areas, receive government resources, and successfully reenter society.35
Incarceration also affects people with mental-health needs in uniquely
detrimental ways. Competency hearings often delay trial, interfering with a person’s
due process rights and extending their time in confinement, and people are often
not able to remain mentally stable while living in a jail setting.36 As a result of
increasingly harsh policies and conditions of confinement, as well as the
de-emphasis on rehabilitation as a goal of incarceration in American corrections,
“the personal challenges posed and psychological harms inflicted in the course of
incarceration have grown over the last several decades in the United States.”37 For
people with mental illness, who have unique needs and are more likely to be
victimized or exploited, the effects of isolation, violence, stress, and
institutionalization are even more dangerous.38

33. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 601 (1999).
34. Jailing People with Mental Illness, supra note 1 (“Once in jail . . . [t]hey stay longer than their
counterparts without mental illness. They are at risk of victimization and often their mental health
conditions get worse.”).
35. CHRISTINE KARAMAGI, SELENA TEJI & VISHNU SRIDHARAN, CALIFORNIANS FOR
SAFETY & JUST., REPAIRING THE ROAD TO REDEMPTION IN CALIFORNIA 7 (2018), https://
www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/californiansforsafetyandjustice/csj_secondchances.pdf
[ https://
perma.cc/Y8TF-KR47 ].
36. A competency hearing is scheduled when a person may be unable to assist in their own
defense or understand the charges against them. If the person is found incompetent, they will be
committed to a mental institution until they are well enough to stand trial. If they are found competent,
their trial will continue forward. Margaret Wilkinson Smith, Note, Restore, Revert, Repeat: Examining
the Decompensation Cycle and the Due Process Limitations on the Treatment of Incompetent Defendants, 71
VAND. L. REV. 319, 322, 330 (2018).
37. Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for Post-Prison
Adjustment, in PAPERS PREPARED FOR THE “FROM PRISON TO HOME” CONFERENCE (U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs. ed., 2002), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/75001/Haney.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/2QAE-5TU6 ].
38. SASHA ABRAMSKY & JAMIE FELLNER, HUM. RTS. WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS
AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 2–3 (Joseph Saunders & James Ross eds., 2003),
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/usa1003.pdf [ https://perma.cc/3XET-3BZM ].
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II. THE ADA, OLMSTEAD, AND THE INTEGRATED-CARE MANDATE RENDER
“MENTAL HEALTH JAILS” ILLEGAL
The rapidly growing group of people who are incarcerated as a result of their
mental illness may have some protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), which guarantees the right of people with disabilities to receive care in their
communities rather than in restrictive institutions. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring
articulated the meaning of the integrated-care mandate of the ADA, which prohibits
the government from unnecessarily segregating people based on their disability.39
This type of discriminatory segregation is what happens when counties fail to
provide treatment and housing, to respond to mental-health crises with law
enforcement, and to adequately fund alternatives to incarceration. This criminal
legal response to the mental-health crisis causes people who could otherwise live
successfully in their communities to be segregated in carceral facilities.40 Olmstead
litigation that focuses on a jail as the central segregating institution could be used as
a tool to either challenge the concept of a “mental health jail” or enforce releases
from jail into diversion programs and other alternatives to incarceration.
A. The Olmstead Mandate for Integrated Care
Olmstead established the reach of the ADA’s mandate for integrated care.41
Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of a person’s disability.42
In the opening provisions of the ADA, Congress states, “[H]istorically, society has
tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some
improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities
continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.”43 To address this problem,
Congress specifically prohibited discrimination against individuals with disabilities,
including unnecessary segregation.44
The ADA empowered and directed the U.S. Attorney General to create
regulations “consistent with this chapter and with the coordination regulations
. . . applicable to recipients of Federal financial assistance under section 794 of title
29,” otherwise known as section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.45 One of
the regulations that section 504 imposes on recipients of federal funding is to
“administer programs and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
needs of qualified handicapped persons.”46 In keeping with the mandate of the
39. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
40. Id. at 600.
41. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(2), (3), (5) (“(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities
persists in such critical areas as . . . institutionalization”; (5) “individuals with disabilities continually
encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, . . . failure to make
modifications to existing facilities and practices, . . . [and] segregation.”).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b).
46. 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d) (2021).
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ADA, the Attorney General issued the regulation that a “public entity shall
administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.”47
The preamble to the Attorney General’s Title II regulations defines “the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities”
to mean “a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with
non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible.”48 An accompanying regulation,
the “reasonable-modification regulation,” requires public entities to “make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless
the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.”49
The meaning and impact of the integrated-care mandate was defined when
the Supreme Court interpreted the ADA in Olmstead.50 In 1999, two women
diagnosed with mental illnesses, L.C. and E.W., brought a lawsuit seeking to enforce
this integration mandate and win release from mental institutions.51 In May 1993,
L.C., who was living in a residential psychiatric facility, had stabilized and her
treatment team recommended that she be released and receive outpatient treatment
through a community-based state program;52 “Despite this evaluation, [she]
remained institutionalized until February 1996.”53 E.W. was voluntarily admitted to
a psychiatric unit in February 1995, and in March 1995, E.W.’s team sought to
discharge her to a homeless shelter, but her attorney objected to the plan as
inappropriate for her needs.54 By 1996, E.W.’s psychiatrist had concluded that she
could be treated through a community-based program; nevertheless, she remained
institutionalized until the District Court’s decision in the Olmstead case in 1997.55
The women sued Georgia health-care providers who kept them in restrictive
residential mental-health facilities long after state employees had evaluated them
and found them both to be ready for a more integrated step-down program in
their communities.56
The Supreme Court found that such segregation is discrimination because it
“perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or
unworthy of participating in community life” and “severely diminishes the everyday
life activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work options,

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2021).
28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B (2021) (analyzing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2021)).
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2021).
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
Id. at 588.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.”57
Because of that, “[u]njustified isolation . . . is properly regarded as discrimination
based on disability.”58
Olmstead’s final holding asserts that states must provide community-based
treatment for citizens with mental disabilities when “treatment professionals
determine that such placement is appropriate, the affected persons do not oppose
such treatment, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into
account the resources available to the State and the needs of others with mental
disabilities.”59 Yet many people with disabilities remain segregated in jails and
prisons across the country because of charges related to disabilities affecting their
mental health, even though these people are eligible for diversion and could recover
more successfully in community-based treatment.60
B. Jails are a Segregated Setting
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) defines “segregated settings” as
including, but not being limited to,
(1) congregate settings populated exclusively or primarily with individuals
with disabilities; (2) congregate settings characterized by regimentation in
daily activities, lack of privacy or autonomy, policies limiting visitors, or
limits on individuals’ ability to engage freely in community activities and to
manage their own activities of daily living; or (3) settings that provide for
daytime activities primarily with other individuals with disabilities.61
Jails and prisons fall under the second described type of institution. Jails are
congregate settings in which regimentation and deprivation of autonomy,
opportunity, and comfort are the central and pervasive elements. Restrictions on
incarcerated individuals are extreme, and they are completely segregated from their
communities and outside lives.
Often, incarcerated people with mental illness are even more segregated and
restricted within jails and prisons than their incarcerated neighbors without similar
mental illness.62 Jails and prisons often rely on isolation and physical
57. Id. at 600–01.
58. Id. at 597.
59. Id. at 607.
60. Westervelt & Baker, supra note 7 (“Many were left to fend for themselves [after asylum
closures]. Substance abuse and homelessness sometimes followed, as did encounters with police, who
often are called first to help deal with the effects of or related to mental crises . . . . The lack of available
treatment beds nationally means more people with a mental illness are stuck in jails until one becomes
available, often for painfully long periods.”).
61.
C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON
ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTEGRATION MANDATE OF TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT AND OLMSTEAD V. L.C. (2011), https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/
q&a_olmstead.htm [ https://perma.cc/9YEC-5V37 ].
62. Elliot Oberholtzer, Police, Courts, Jails, and Prisons All Fail Disabled People, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Aug.
23,
2017),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/08/23/disability
[ https://perma.cc/9E38-2NQC ] (“Human Rights Watch suggests that use of force abuses against
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restraints—including exclusion from programs, solitary confinement, chains, or
strait jackets—to address the mental-health challenges of incarcerated people.63 The
problem is so pervasive that the DOJ created regulations: (1) prohibiting
discrimination against people with disabilities inside carceral institutions,
(2) mandating that people with disabilities be given access to programs and facilities,
and (3) prohibiting unnecessary reliance on solitary confinement and segregation
because of a person’s disability.64
Courts have found that services provided in jails are subject to the integration
mandate, and incarcerated people have successfully challenged isolation within jails
and delays in competency procedures under Olmstead.65 The Third Circuit found
that unreasonable delays in the competency evaluation, treatment process, and
transfer to civil commitment for a person who was found incompetent to stand trial

disabled people in prisons is ‘widespread and may be increasing.’ The AVID Prison
Project reports that disabled people in prison, particularly those with mental illnesses, are
disproportionately disciplined with segregation and solitary confinement, which have been linked to
suicide, self-harm, and other serious mental health consequences.”); see also RACHAEL SEEVERS,
MAKING HARD TIME HARDER: PROGRAMMATIC ACCOMMODATIONS FOR INMATES WITH
DISABILITIES UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 4 (2016), http://
avidprisonproject.org/Making-Hard-Time-Harder/assets/making-hard-time-harder—-pdf-version
.pdf [ https://perma.cc/YD3Q-V55J ] (“The U.S. has also seen a rise in the number of people with
mental illness and developmental and cognitive disabilities in prison. National surveys now indicate that
as many as 31 percent of inmates in state prisons report having at least one disability. While prison is
hard for everyone, incarceration is even more challenging for inmates with disabilities. Research shows
that inmates with disabilities are sentenced to an average of fifteen more months in prison as compared
to other inmates with similar criminal convictions. The time they serve is also harder, with more
sanctions imposed and less access to positive programming than other inmates. Prisoners with
disabilities are also four times more likely to report recent psychological distress as compared to inmates
without disabilities. In a system intended to control and sanction behavior believed to violate the many
regulations that govern prison life, inmates with disabilities who need accommodations are often
overlooked, ignored, or even punished.”); DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF
JUST. STATS., NCJ 213600, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1, 4, 8, 10
(2006), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf [ https://perma.cc/EU6P-AR64 ] (finding
that incarcerated people with mental health needs experienced higher rates of homelessness before
arrest, more instances of disciplinary actions, higher rates of recidivism, were more likely to be injured
in a fight while incarcerated, and were more likely to serve longer sentences).
63. ABRAMSKY & FELLNER, supra note 38, at 79–80, 150–51.
64. 28 C.F.R. § 35.152 (2021); see also Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Josie Sivaraman, David
L. Rosen, David H. Cloud, Gary Junker, Scott Proescholdbell, Meghan E. Shanahan & Shabbar
I. Ranapurwala, Association of Restrictive Housing During Incarceration with Mortality After Release, 2
JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Oct. 2019, at 1 (“This cohort study included 229 274 people who were
released from incarceration in North Carolina from 2000 to 2015. Compared with individuals who were
incarcerated and not placed in restrictive housing, individuals who spent any time in restrictive housing
were 24% more likely to die in the first year after release, especially from suicide (78% more likely) and
homicide (54% more likely); they were also 127% more likely to die of an opioid overdose in the first
2 weeks after release.”); Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 325, 333 (2006) (“[I]ncarceration in solitary [can cause] either severe
exacerbation or recurrence of preexisting illness, or the appearance of an acute mental illness in
individuals who had previously been free of any such illness.”).
65. Sahar Takshi, Note, Behind Bars and in the Hole: Applying Olmstead to Incarcerated
Individuals with Mental Illness, 27 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 319, 342 (2020).
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violated the integration mandate.66 Another plaintiff claimed that the Washington
Department of Corrections violated the ADA by placing him in isolation and
sometimes using physical restraints as a response to symptoms of his mental illness,
including self-harm behaviors; the district court found that a reasonable jury
could agree.67
As restrictive and often abusive inpatient treatment facilities are closed in
response to the movement towards community-based care, states are nonetheless
failing to adequately invest in care and housing and jails are filling up with people
who never received the community care their state promised to provide.68 After the
Olmstead decision, Georgia set a goal of releasing all residents of its psychiatric
facilities into community-based care.69 Many of its mental institutions were
converted into prisons, symbolizing a new era when incarceration would become
the country’s response to its mental-health crisis.70
C. Olmstead in the Context of Community Movements to Stop Jail Expansion
Almost every state has penal code statutes that allow eligible people to apply
for diversion programs instead of receiving a jail or prison sentence. Under
California law, people who are convicted of a first-time, nonviolent drug offense
are eligible to be diverted to community treatment programs.71 California law also
provides an opportunity for pretrial diversion, which suspends charges while the
accused person completes a treatment plan and dismisses the accused person upon
successful completion of the program, allowing people to end up with no criminal
record.72 A person is eligible for pretrial mental-health diversion if (1) the person
suffers from a Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)73
diagnosable mental disorder, (2) the mental disorder was a significant factor in the

66. Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 365 (3d Cir. 2018).
67. Brown v. Wash. Dep’t of Corr., No. C13-5367 RBL-JRC, 2015 WL 4039322, at *11
(W.D. Wash. May 13, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. C13-05367 RBL, 2015 WL 4039270
(W.D. Wash. July 2, 2015).
68. Jenna Bao, Prisons: The New Asylums, HARV. POL. REV. (Mar. 9, 2020), https://
harvardpolitics.com/prisons-the-new-asylums [ https://perma.cc/AAB9-RZTU ] (“People with
mental illness are 4.5 times more likely than members of the general population to be arrested. As a
result, in 2009, the prevalence of mental illness in prisons and jails was three to six times that of the
general population . . . . [T]he deinstitutionalization seen in the 1950s played a pivotal role in shifting
the seriously mentally ill from long term healthcare institutions to the justice system.”).
69. Doug Monroe, Asylum: Inside Central State Hospital, Once the World’s Largest Mental
Institution, ATLANTA (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.atlantamagazine.com/great-reads/asylum-insidecentral-state-hospital-worlds-largest-mental-institution [ https://perma.cc/9T7F-CCFB ].
70. See, e.g., id.
71. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000 (West 2018).
72. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.36 (West 2020).
73. The DSM is the American Psychiatric Association’s handbook used by health care
professionals in the United States as the authoritative guide to the diagnosis of mental disorders. See
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th
ed. 2013), https://cdn.website-editor.net/30f11123991548a0af708722d458e476/files/uploaded/
DSM%2520V.pdf [ https://perma.cc/2UV6-92VD ].

Clean Final Edit_Kahn.docx (Do Not Delete)

1454

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

8/19/21 3:06 PM

[Vol. 11:1441

commission of the charged offense, (3) the mental disorder would respond to
treatment, (4) the person consents to treatment and waives their right to a speedy
trial, (5) the person agrees to comply with the treatment plan, and (6) the judge does
not believe that the person poses a public safety threat.74 Certain crimes, such as
violent crimes and sex crimes, are not eligible for diversion under section 1001.36
of the California Penal Code;75 however, far fewer people than are eligible are
granted diversion. District attorneys are often reluctant to agree to diversion in plea
negotiations, and judges are often reluctant to release people even if they are
eligible.76 Even when the district attorney and judge may want to grant the diversion
petition, some people are prevented from entering community treatment because
there is no space available in the appropriate community housing, mental-health
treatment facility, or drug rehabilitation program.77
Counties that have implemented plans to expand alternatives to incarceration
have found that it results in better outcomes and reductions in costs. In Los
Angeles, community activists prevented construction of a new “mental health
jail.”78 The decision came a few years after the county established the Office of
Diversion and Reentry, which was tasked in part with placing eligible people in
diversion programs.79 The RAND Corporation has conducted a comprehensive
study finding six-month and twelve-month housing stability rates of ninety-one
percent and seventy-four percent, respectively.80 During the first year after being
placed in housing, only fourteen percent of eligible people had new felony
convictions, as opposed to national recidivism averages of forty-four percent during

74.
75.
76.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.36(b)(1)(A)–(F) (West 2020).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.36(b)(2) (West 2020).
See, e.g., Todd Spitzer, Opinion, ‘Mental Disorder’ Now a Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card,
ORANGE CNTY. REG. ( July 9, 2018, 8:01 PM), https://www.ocregister.com/2018/07/07/mentaldisorder-now-a-get-out-of-jail-free-card [ https://perma.cc/2Y4S-YDWA ].
77. CAL. CORR. STANDARDS AUTH., CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., JAILS AND THE
MENTALLY ILL: ISSUES AND ANALYSIS 18 (2009), https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/
Administration/Planning_and_Analysis/Mental%20Health%20Diversion%20Program/2338%20Jails
%20and%20the%20Mentally%20Ill.pdf [ https://perma.cc/WMG7-87FN ] [ hereinafter CSA REPORT ].
78. Martin Macias Jr., LA County Cancels Mental Health Jail Project in Favor of “Care First”
Approach, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/la-countycancels-mental-health-jail-project-in-favor-of-care-first-approach [ https://perma.cc/GSU6-SV35 ].
79. Office of Diversion and Reentry, HEALTH SERVS. L.A. CNTY., https://dhs.lacounty.gov/
office-of-diversion-and-reentry/our-services/office-of-diversion-and-reentry [ https://perma.cc/
LK85-DDKJ ] (last visited July 9, 2021) (“The Office of Diversion and Reentry (ODR) was created in
September 2015 by the Board of Supervisors. Its mission is to develop and implement county-wide
criminal justice diversion for persons with mental and/or substance use disorders, to provide reentry
support services based on individual’s needs, and to reduce youth involvement with the
justice system.”).
80. SARAH B. HUNTER & ADAM SCHERLING, RAND CORP., LOS ANGELES COUNTY OFFICE
OF DIVERSION AND REENTRY’S SUPPORTIVE HOUSING PROGRAM: A STUDY OF PARTICIPANTS’
HOUSING STABILITY AND NEW FELONY CONVICTIONS (2019), https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR3232.html [ https://perma.cc/8S5A-48SD ].

Clean Final Edit_Kahn.docx (Do Not Delete)

2021]

OLMSTEAD AS A TOOL FOR DECARCERATION

8/19/21 3:06 PM

1455

the first year after release.81 Despite these efforts, Los Angeles still has thousands
of people currently eligible for diversion living in the “mental health unit” of the
Los Angeles jail. The RAND Corporation published a study showing that over
3,300 individuals—more than half of the people incarcerated in the “mental health
unit” in Los Angeles’s jail—were eligible for diversion but had not been diverted
because of a lack of available community alternatives.82
People who are trapped in jail because of a lack of available treatment beds,
particularly people who are trapped in the psychiatric unit of a jail, which is more
restrictive and isolated than general population units, can show the “unjustified
isolation . . . based on disability” described in Olmstead.83 Those who are eligible for
other types of diversion are able to attend classes or otherwise fulfill diversion
requirements while living in their communities. Because of their disabilities, those
people who need treatment beds, additional support, or mental-health care in order
to be released are not provided the same opportunity. The DOJ acknowledges that
“[s]tate and local governments must prevent unnecessary institutionalization of
people with disabilities. Governments have complied with this obligation by using
community-based treatment services to keep people with disabilities out of the
criminal justice system.”84
Even though there may be other factors contributing to a person’s isolation,
including the criminal act for which that person is charged, a plaintiff can show
discrimination because their disability was a proximate cause of the isolation, and
“the existence of additional factors causing an injury does not necessarily negate the
fact that the defendant’s wrong is also the legal cause of the injury.”85 Even if other
incarcerated people without a disability are unable to access diversion, courts could
find that the plaintiffs are excluded from integration with their communities
because of disability:
Moreover, as we noted earlier, the fact that individuals other than the class
members have been unable to obtain benefits does not of itself
demonstrate that the plaintiffs do not face conditions that are more
onerous for them because of their particular disabilities. The absence of
disparate impact would not prove that [the New York City Division of
AIDS Services and Income Support] is effective enough to provide
81. Id.; MARIEL ALPER, MATTHEW R. DUROSE & JOSHUA MARKMAN, BUREAU OF
JUST. STATS., NCJ 250975, 2018 UPDATE ON PRISONER RECIDIVISM: A 9-YEAR FOLLOW-UP
PERIOD (2005-2014) (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/18upr9yfup0514.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/KBF4-4ADL ].
82. HOLLIDAY, supra note 22.
83. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999).
84. C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXAMPLES AND RESOURCES TO SUPPORT CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ENTITIES IN COMPLIANCE WITH TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
(2017), https://www.ada.gov/cjta.html [ https://perma.cc/G7ZM-EYZH ].
85. Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 278 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that the “additional
factors”—inherent limitations attendant HIV/AIDS status—did not preclude a finding of
discrimination based on disability in an Olmstead claim against New York’s HIV/AIDS support
programs (citing Hydro Invs., Inc. v. Trafalgar Power Inc., 227 F.3d 8, 15 (2d Cir. 2000))).
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benefits under a state of affairs where the social services system functioned
smoothly. Where the District Court has clearly identified disability-related
challenges that make access more difficult for the plaintiff class than for
those without disabilities, and has found the accommodative scheme to be
“broken,” we hold that the plaintiffs have demonstrated that their
disabilities are a cause of the denial of access to benefits.86
Relying on jails to fill the role of treatment centers severely harms disabled
communities. As activists call for integrated, community-based care and housing,
counties across the nation are responding to mental-health crises by pouring more
and more of their budgets into law enforcement and expanding carceral facilities.87
This drains money from social services, leaving even more people without the
resources they need to live stable lives in their communities, simultaneously
increasing the likelihood that they will end up confronted by police. Plaintiffs have
alleged that governments “are violating the ADA’s integration mandate by failing to
provide sufficient community-based treatment facilities as alternatives to jail[,]”
leading police “to arrest subclass members and institutionalize them in jail where
subclass members can receive some type of treatment.”88 Counties can come into
compliance with the integration mandate by developing community-based
programs that comply with the integration mandate and benefit the class of people
who are impacted by the criminal legal system because of their disability.89
In April 2021, the DOJ found that Alameda County’s failure to provide mental
health services in the most integrated setting appropriate to patients’ needs puts
Alameda community members with disabilities at serious risk of incarceration in
violation of the ADA.90 The DOJ indicated that a failure to provide basic
mental-health services in the community, resulting in a greater risk of incarceration
for people with mental illnesses, constitutes the risk of institutionalization described
in Olmstead.91
Olmstead presents a novel approach to fighting the expansion of the carceral
state and forcing counties to invest in housing and community-based care. Olmstead
litigation could increase investment in community-based care that allows people at
risk of arrest to live more safely and successfully in their community. Advocates
fighting the expansion of carceral responses to social justice issues and community
86. Id. at 279–80.
87. See, e.g., Lowrey, supra note 4.
88. McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, No. 95 CV 24 JAP/KBM, 2016 WL 9818311, at *15
(D.N.M. Nov. 9, 2016).
89. Id.
90. Alameda County, John George Psychiatric Hospital, and Santa Rita Jail Investigative Findings
and Next Steps, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/
file/1388976/download [ https://perma.cc/XH2A-82SC ] [ hereinafter Alameda County ]; Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Finds Alameda County, California, Violates the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the U.S. Constitution (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/justice-department-finds-alameda-county-california-violates-americans-disabilities-act-and-us
[ https://perma.cc/NC4D-XGLZ ].
91. Alameda County, supra note 90.

Clean Final Edit_Kahn.docx (Do Not Delete)

2021]

OLMSTEAD AS A TOOL FOR DECARCERATION

8/19/21 3:06 PM

1457

harms have long argued that society’s failures to provide services and support, rather
than the individual characteristics of criminalized people, are the root of public
safety problems.92 Olmstead litigation could establish counties’ legal obligation to
rely on social services and support, rather than social control and punishment, to
protect the health of their communities.
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL ALTERATION DEFENSE IN THE JAILS CONTEXT
A. Fundamental Alteration
The greatest obstacle to bringing an Olmstead case with a jail as the central
institution is the government’s fundamental alteration defense:
States are required to provide community-based treatment for persons
with mental disabilities when the State’s treatment professionals determine
that such placement is appropriate, the affected persons do not oppose
such treatment, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated,
taking into account the resources available to the State and the needs of
others with mental disabilities.93
A reasonable accommodation is one that does not fundamentally alter existing
services.94 If the government can demonstrate that the requested modification
would “fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity,” the
government is not required to make it.95 If the state can prove that releasing people
would require a fundamental alteration of the nature of the services it provides,
would cause a prohibitive financial burden on the state, or would require the
government to create new programs, then the government can avoid an order
mandating it to release people to community care.96
Several factors can be considered in a fundamental alteration defense,
including “the state’s ability to continue meeting the needs of other institutionalized
mental health patients for whom community placement is not appropriate, whether
the state has a waiting list for community placements, and whether the state has
developed a comprehensive plan to move eligible patients into community care
settings.”97 In order to establish the government’s obligation to release people and

92. Mariame Kaba, So You’re Thinking About Becoming an Abolitionist, LEVEL (Oct. 29, 2020),
https://level.medium.com/so-youre-thinking-about-becoming-an-abolitionist-a436f8e31894 [ https://
perma.cc/VD4K-QVTD ] (“While some people might think of abolition as primarily a negative project
— ‘Let’s tear everything down tomorrow and hope for the best’ — PIC abolition is a vision of a
restructured society in a world where we have everything we need: food, shelter, education, health, art,
beauty, clean water, and more. Things that are foundational to our personal and community safety.”).
93. United States v. Mississippi, 400 F. Supp. 3d 546, 551 (S.D. Miss. 2019) (quoting Olmstead
v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999)).
94. Id. at 576.
95. Id. n.8; see also Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 592.
96. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1998); see also Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 592.
97. Frederick L. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 364 F.3d 487, 495 (3d Cir. 2004); accord Olmstead,
527 U.S. at 605–06.
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provide community-based care as an alternative to incarceration, litigation would
have to overcome these defenses, which are uniquely challenging in the jail context.
Simply moving services from a more restrictive setting into a community
setting does not constitute a fundamental alteration.98 However, Title II of the ADA
does not require public entities to create new programs that provide previously
unprovided services for people with disabilities.99 Title II of the ADA does mandate
that if a person is being provided mental-health treatment by the county in a
segregated setting and a treatment professional has determined that an
integrated-community placement is appropriate, the county has an obligation to
make reasonable accommodations to allow that person to receive treatment in the
less restrictive setting.100 Although that does not mean that the county must create
new community services, it may mean that a county has an obligation to expand
existing services, including by building supportive housing, expanding outpatient
treatment resources, and providing other integrated support for patients living at
home.101 Cost can be a consideration in the fundamental alteration analysis, but “a
singular focus upon a state’s short-term fiscal constraints will not suffice to
establish a fundamental-alteration defense.”102
B. State’s Fundamental Alteration of the Nature of Community Programs Defense
In Olmstead litigation that focuses on a jail as the segregated institution, the
state could raise several credible fundamental-alteration defenses. The ADA does
not require fundamental alteration of the essential nature of a program.103 The state
can bring an affirmative defense that the proposed changes will fundamentally alter
their program or service if those changes preclude the purpose of the program.104
Abolitionists argue that carceral models harm rather than protect the health and
safety of communities, but the state would likely argue that incarcerating people
serves a primarily penological purpose and a community alternative such as
supportive housing, outpatient care, or caseworker and peer support is not intended
to serve penological purposes such as retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation.
Moving someone whom the state believes needs to be incarcerated could force
community-based programs to fundamentally alter the nature of the programs’
services to accommodate penological purposes.

98. Townsend v. Quasim, 328 F.3d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 2003).
99. Id. at 518.
100. See United States v. Mississippi, 400 F. Supp. 3d 546, 550–51 (S.D. Miss. 2019); Olmstead,
527 U.S. at 607.
101. See Mississippi, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 555–57.
102. Frederick L., 364 F.3d at 495.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(f) (2018).
104. See Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 (1979) (analyzing fundamental
alteration in the context of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and finding that a nursing
school was not required to accommodate a deaf student because the purpose of the school was to train
nurses who could function in traditional nursing jobs, which require hearing and verbally
communicating with patients and doctors).
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The state might argue that because a jail serves a primarily punitive purpose,
releasing eligible people into alternative programs would fundamentally alter this
purpose. In Greist v. Norristown State Hospital, Greist, who had murdered members
of his family and been committed after pleading not guilty by reason of insanity,
sought release from the mental hospital.105 The court denied release, finding that
“[t]o require state courts to release such individuals into the community would
fundamentally alter the nature of Pennsylvania’s involuntary commitment program
by making an essential purpose of the program—protecting the
community—impossible to accomplish.”106
If the government can argue that a public program’s purpose and essential
nature, such as the penological functions of a jail, would be frustrated by releasing
people, the government may overcome a lawsuit.107 However, if plaintiffs can
collect data to show that people with unmet mental-health needs are eligible for
diversion, they could argue that there is no penological justification for incarcerating
those people. A California Corrections Standards Authority report found that
“[s]ome counties’ jails are not equipped to handle [incarcerated people with mental
health needs],” but they “simply do not have any other treatment beds to put them
in.”108 The report stated,
It is clear—there are nowhere near enough mental health treatment
facilities in communities. Those that do exist are not anxious to take what
they call “penal code patients,” and especially not those they believe to be
violent and/or aggressive. So, while diversion to treatment facilities is often
the best choice, it is often not a realistic possibility.109
In the case of a county that cannot release diversion-eligible people into the
community solely because there are too few available beds, the state could not argue
that expanding community treatment and diversion options to accept currently
incarcerated eligible participants would pose a safety risk to or alter the purpose of
the criminal legal system. The essential nature of a jail is to serve penological
purposes of incapacitation, retribution, and deterrence.110 None of these purposes
are served when a person who is eligible for diversion based on state law and a
county’s criteria remains incarcerated. For diversion-eligible people,

105. Greist v. Norristown State Hosp., No. CIV. A. 96-CV-8495, 1997 WL 661097, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 1997), aff’d, 156 F.3d 1224 (3d Cir. 1998) (upholding under the ADA a fundamental
alteration defense because of danger to the community in pre-Olmstead litigation).
106. Id.
107. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999) (establishing that the
government can defend against an Olmstead claim if the requested changes constitute a fundamental
alteration to its nature).
108. CSA REPORT, supra note 77, at 10.
109. Id.
110. See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1206, 1212–13 (11th Cir. 2010) (analyzing the
reasonableness of a below-guidelines prison sentence based on whether it fulfilled the penological
purposes of retribution, incapacitation, and deterrence (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(c) (2020)).
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rehabilitation—not incapacitation, retribution, or deterrence—is the most
appropriate goal, and that goal is better served by integrated care.111
Mental-health diversion was established because people with mental illness,
especially those who are charged with a crime that arises from symptoms of that
illness, have unique mental-health treatment and support needs and experience
better outcomes and lower recidivism in community-based treatment than jail.112
Diversion serves the purpose of rehabilitation, a goal which is especially achievable
when a person’s actions are caused by a treatable disorder.113 Jails are unable to serve
the purpose of rehabilitation with similar efficacy because they are not equipped to
provide mental-health treatment.114
The lack of available resources in communities leaves law enforcement and
carceral facilities to act as mental-health treatment facilities, a function they were
never intended to serve.115 Rather than requiring a fundamental alteration,
transferring eligible people out of jails and into community care would allow
government programs to serve their intended essential purpose.
C. State’s Fundamental Alteration Defense Based on Prohibitive Cost
The state could also argue that the cost of shifting services from jails to
community settings is prohibitive and would disrupt its ability to provide other
programs. The reason that many jails are currently underutilizing diversion
programs and housing is a lack of funding or a failure to invest funding in
community-based treatment instead of jails.116 However, it is established that if a
court were focusing “only on immediate costs, . . . it would be inconsistent
111. Pretrial Diversion, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 28, 2017), https://
www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-diversion.aspx
[ https://perma.cc/Q5SJGCHW ] (explaining that diversion aims to address criminogenic needs rather than to punish behavior).
112. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.35 (West 2021) (providing an introduction to the California
pretrial mental health diversion statute); see also CSA REPORT, supra note 77, at x (“It is treatment
effective and cost effective to divert from jail everyone, especially people with mental illnesses, who can
be safely managed in the community.”).
113. BRIAN STETTIN, FREDERICK J. FRESE & H. RICHARD LAMB, TREATMENT
ADVOC. CTR., MENTAL HEALTH DIVERSION PRACTICES: A SURVEY OF STATES 4 (2013), https://
www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/2013-diversion-study.pdf [ https://perma.cc/
Y35Y-JPFX ] (“It stands to reason that where offenses are caused by lack of treatment, the antidote to
re-offense is treatment, not incarceration.”).
114. See Mental Illness, Human Rights, and US Prisons, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 22, 2009,
11:16 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/09/22/mental-illness-human-rights-and-us-prisons
[ https://perma.cc/P69E-8GWG ] (“[P]risons are ill-equipped to respond appropriately to the needs of
prisoners with mental illness. Prison mental health services are all too frequently woefully deficient,
crippled by understaffing, insufficient facilities, and limited programs.”).
115. See Westervelt & Baker, supra note 7 (stating that today, the three largest county institutions
providing mental health treatment in the country are the Los Angeles County Jail in California, Cook
County Jail in Illinois, and Rikers Island Jail in New York).
116. See CSA REPORT, supra note 77, at 4–5 (“Some cost-shifting—moving mental health
money and criminal justice money around—might be needed to fund alternatives, diversion and
treatment that helps get mentally ill people out of jail and keeps those who are out of custody from
coming back.”).
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with Olmstead and the governing statutes.”117 This right to care extends to
circumstances when integrated care would incur costs that strain the state’s
budget.118 In M.R. v. Dreyfus, Washington was facing budget challenges and an
across-the-board reduction in general fund appropriations to all state agencies in
Washington.119 These budget reductions resulted in cuts to the Medicaid funding
for in-home care services (along with other services).120 The Ninth Circuit found
that the plaintiffs challenging the reduction of covered services were likely to
succeed on the merits because their right to integrated care was not overcome by
the state’s budgetary restrictions.121
The budgetary defense especially lacks merit in the context of jails. The
long-term cost of incarceration is higher than the cost of care-first approaches,
housing-first models, and diversion programs.122 Alternatives to incarceration
reduce costs to counties because incarceration is one of the most expensive
responses to unstable behavior.123 In many cases, the government does not lack the
necessary funding; it has simply engaged in a “pattern and practice of under-funding
community services and its over-reliance on institutional treatment has created a
systemic deficiency in the array of available community services.”124
Diversion and community care also reduce recidivism, interrupting costly
cycles of repeated incarceration. Providing supportive housing not only costs less
than incarceration but also reduces the number of expensive hospitalizations and
need for crisis response by helping people achieve mental stability.125 Research
shows that recidivism rates for people with serious mental illness who are jailed are
between fifty-four and sixty-eight percent,126 but the recidivism rate for people

117. Frederick L. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 364 F.3d 487, 495 (3d Cir. 2004).
118. See M.R. v. Dreyfus, 697 F.3d 706, 706 (9th Cir. 2012).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Gary A. Zarkin, Alexander J. Cowell, Katherine A. Hicks, Michael J. Mills, Steven
Belenko, Laura J. Dunlap & Vincent Keyes, Lifetime Benefits and Costs of Diverting Substance-Abusing
Offenders from State Prison, 61 CRIME & DELINQ. 829, 844 (2012) (finding that if just ten percent of
people eligible for diversion were sent to community-based substance abuse treatment programs rather
than prison, the criminal justice system would save $8.5 billion when compared to current practices);
see also JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH L., A PLACE OF MY OWN: HOW THE
ADA IS CREATING INTEGRATED HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES
6 (2014), http://www.bazelon.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/A-Place-of-my-Own.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/879B-87AP ].
123. See, e.g., FAIRMOUNT VENTURES, INC., EVALUATION OF PATHWAYS TO HOUSING PA 3
( 2011), https://centercityphila.org/uploads/attachments/cit0g2r8x0029f6qdpgp9b8ja-pathways-tohousing.pdf [ https://perma.cc/43KE-X922 ].
124. Kenneth R. ex rel. Tri-Cnty. CAP, Inc./GS v. Hassan, 293 F.R.D. 254, 260 (D.N.H. 2013)
(finding that plaintiffs’ assertion that unnecessary detention in nursing homes violated the integration
mandate were sufficient to establish commonality for class certification).
125. See JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH L., supra note 122.
126. Amy Blank Wilson, Jeffrey Draine, Trevor Hadley, Steve Metraux & Arthur Evans,
Examining the Impact of Mental Illness and Substance Use on Recidivism in a County Jail, 34 INT’L
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 264, 264–68 n.4 (2011).
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placed in housing and community care by Los Angeles’s Office of Diversion and
Reentry was only fourteen percent.127 This argument was directly addressed in the
Olmstead decision, which held that a cost-centered fundamental alteration defense
would be overcome if the county could “provide services to plaintiffs in the
community at considerably less cost than is required to maintain them in
an institution.”128
Finally, the state might argue that although treatment in the community may
be more cost-effective in individual cases, it could not fully benefit from these
savings because it needs to maintain the existing jail even if the jail population is
reduced.129 In Frederick L. v. Department of Public Welfare, the court found that
“courts may not merely compare the cost of institutionalization against the cost of
community-based health services because such a comparison would not account for
the state’s financial obligation to continue to operate partially full institutions with
fixed overhead costs.”130 This defense lacks merit because reducing the jail
population, even without closing the jail, does result in considerable cost savings.131
The insufficiency of this defense is even more stark in counties where activists
are fighting the construction of new “mental health jails.” If a county cancels
construction of a planned jail, it is benefitting from shutting an existing facility,
relieving it of the “obligation to continue to operate partially full institutions with
fixed overhead costs.”132 Cancelling a planned segregated setting such as a jail saves
millions or even billions of dollars, and therefore the state cannot claim that funding
community-based care is fiscally impossible.133
D. State’s Fundamental Alteration Defense Based on Existing Services Fulfilling the
County’s ADA Obligations or Because There is No Requirement to Create a
New Program
Some courts have found that the state is “not required to create new programs
that provide heretofore unprovided services to assist disabled persons.”134
127. Memorandum from Christina R. Ghaly, Director, Los Angeles Cnty. Dep’t of Health
Servs., to Los Angeles Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors (Sept. 9, 2019), http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/
bos/bc/1061487_PROGRESSREPORTONSCALINGUPDIVERSIONANDREENTRYEFFORTS
FORPEOPLEWITHSERIOUSCLINICALNEEDS.pdf [ https://perma.cc/B856-Y5RE ].
128. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 595 (1999) (quoting Appeal to Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536), at 39a).
129. Frederick L. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 364 F.3d 487, 493 (3d Cir. 2004).
130. Id.
131. See JOHN SCHMITT, KRIS WARNER & SARIKA GUPTA, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POL’Y
RSCH., THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION 2 ( 2010), https://www.cepr.net/
documents/publications/incarceration-2010-06.pdf [ https://perma.cc/SB3H-23V9 ].
132. Frederick L., 364 F.3d at 493.
133. States Save Millions by Reducing Inmate Population and Closing Prisons, EQUAL
JUST. INITIATIVE ( Jan. 30, 2014), https://eji.org/news/closing-prisons-saves-states-millions
[ https://perma.cc/3T3W-ZE3F ]; see also County Supervisors Cancel $1.7 Billion Contract for Downtown
Jail Facility, CBS L.A. (Aug. 13, 2019, 9:55 PM), https://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2019/08/13/countysupervisors-cancel-1-7b-contract-for-downtown-jail-facility [ https://perma.cc/3FQP-9Y2T ].
134. Townsend v. Quasim, 328 F.3d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 2003).
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However, many counties’ diversion programs already provide housing,
mental-health care, case workers, and other integrated services.135 The requirement
under the ADA is simply to expand these services and make them available to
people who are eligible for them.136
The state might also argue that it is already providing these services to some
people, and that it has therefore already fulfilled its obligations under the ADA.
However, courts have consistently found that the existence of a service that is
underutilized or not available is insufficient to fulfill this obligation. Olmstead
articulated the boundary of what constitutes reasonable modifications: if the state
had an “effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with mental
disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable
pace not controlled by the State’s endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated,
the reasonable-modifications standard would be met.”137 Absent such an effectively
working plan to place people in the appropriate treatment, the state could not meet
the reasonable-modifications standard even if “existing state programs provided
community-based treatment of the kind for which [plaintiffs] qualified.”138 For
example, in Mississippi, the court found that although “[o]n paper, Mississippi ha[d]
a mental health system with an array of appropriate community-based services,”139
those services were inadequate because they were unavailable, inaccessible, or
served a tiny fraction of those who needed them.140 There is an opportunity to set
precedent by using Olmstead to establish a county’s legal obligation to divest from
incarceration and invest in community-based care.
IV. HOUSING AS AN OUTCOME OF OLMSTEAD LITIGATION
Olmstead does not simply establish a person’s right not to be segregated based
on their disability; it establishes the government’s responsibility to provide
integrated care.141 One common component of the Olmstead plans reached through
litigation settlements is expansion of affordable and supportive housing. Plaintiffs
may seek “injunctive relief requiring the State to develop and provide an adequate
array of identified community-based treatment services,” such as “mobile crisis
services, Assertive Community Treatment (‘ACT’), supported housing, and

135. See, e.g., Eric Westervelt, In Los Angeles, A Program to Get Those with Mental Illness Away
from Jails, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Feb. 25, 2020, 4:18 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2020/02/25/809368257/in-los-angeles-a-program-to-get-those-with-mental-illness-away-from-jails
[ https://perma.cc/HF57-2WHA ] (explaining how in Los Angeles, the Diversion and Reentry housing
court places participants in treatment and housing).
136. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1998); see also Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581,
607 (1999).
137. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 584.
138. Id. at 595.
139. United States v. Mississippi, 400 F. Supp. 3d 546, 549 (S.D. Miss. 2019).
140. Id. at 557–62.
141. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607.
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supported employment.”142 Trial courts have ordered diverse remedies, including
an “adequate and flexible array of residential support services and housing
alternatives; housing near community services; effective crisis intervention services
24/7; family support; vocational support; transportation; [and] recreation.”143
Courts have found that when lack of housing is the barrier preventing people
from accessing treatment in their communities, states may be required under the
ADA to provide housing. A court in Minnesota found that a county’s failure to
provide housing that would facilitate access to integrated-treatment options may
constitute a violation of the integrated-care mandate.144 A court in Illinois found
that an Olmstead settlement requiring the state to ensure that residents had access to
housing was fair, adequate, and reasonable.145 A New York court found that the
integration mandate required the state to provide supportive housing to residents
of a more restrictive Adult Home when those residents were qualified to live in
housing in their community.146 Dozens of states are working to develop permanent
supportive housing and affordable housing as part of their Olmstead plans after
reaching a settlement agreement.147 A successful Olmstead claim would not only
establish counties’ obligations but also provide access to stable housing and
integrated care to those people.
In 2013, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
released guidance to HUD-assisted housing providers, supportive housing
providers among them, on how providers can support state and local endeavors to
meet Olmstead obligations.148 HUD guidance explains,
Following the Olmstead decision, there have been increased efforts across
the country to assist individuals who are institutionalized or housed in
other segregated settings to move to integrated, community-based
settings. . . . As a result, there is a great need for affordable, integrated
housing opportunities where individuals with disabilities are able to live

142. Kenneth R. ex rel. Tri-Cnty. CAP, Inc./GS v. Hassan, 293 F.R.D. 254, 260 (D.N.H. 2013).
143. Court Master’s Report Pursuant to Paragraph 299, Bates v. Mayhew, No. CV1989088,
2011 WL 11723788, at *2 (Me. Super. Aug. 16, 2011).
144. Murphy ex rel. Murphy v. Minn. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 260 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1117
(D. Minn. 2017) (finding that plaintiffs had “plausibly assert[ed] viable integration mandate claims”
where they alleged that the county had failed to provide housing options that would allow them to
receive treatment in the community).
145. Williams v. Quinn, 748 F. Supp. 2d 892, 903 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
146. Disability Advocs., Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated sub
nom. based on lack of standing, Disability Advocs., Inc. v. N.Y. Coal. for Quality Assisted Living,
Inc., 675 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
147. Kevin Martone, Nat’l Low Income Housing Coal., Olmstead Implementation, in 2019
ADVOCATES’ GUIDE 6-20, 6-21 (2019), https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/AG-2019/0605_Olmstead-Implementation.pdf [ https://perma.cc/J4U8-9CGG ].
148. Statement on the Role of Housing in Accomplishing the Goals of Olmstead, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOUS. & URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/OLMSTEADGUIDNC060413.PDF
[ https://perma.cc/3AB2-LBJH ] (last visited July 10, 2021).
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and interact with individuals without disabilities, while receiving the health
care and long-term services and supports they need.149
The guidance describes an example of post-Olmstead federal programs, the
Money Follows the Person (MFP) program. The program was authorized by
Congress in 2005 and extended in 2010 under the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, which authorized the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to offer
incentives to states to shift programming out of segregated settings and into
integrated care in the community.150 The MFP program acknowledges that a lack of
access to affordable housing is often a barrier to achieving that goal.151 The guidance
instructs HUD programs to aim to increase access to nonsegregated supportive and
affordable housing.152 In addition to establishing a county’s obligation to provide
integrated care, Olmstead litigation could result in new state bills that would open
funding for supportive housing, shifting some of the funding currently reserved for
jail expansion into community care.
The Corporation for Supportive Housing (CSH) states that supportive
housing plays a key role in creating opportunities for people with disabilities to live
in their communities as mandated by Olmstead.153 CSH defines supportive housing
as “housing without limits on length of stay, affordable to people with extremely
low or no income” and calls it a “proven model that works for people facing severe
obstacles to housing stability, including those with disabilities.”154 As opposed to
shelters (housing that imposes conditions on residents, housing that is temporary,
and housing serving only people with disabilities), permanent supportive housing
complies with Olmstead by providing people with disabilities the opportunity to live
long-term in “a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with
non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible” as required under the ADA.155
Under Olmstead, counties should all provide integrated permanent supportive
housing that is accessible to community members with disabilities and allows them
to access other forms of support.
V. OLMSTEAD AS A LEGAL TOOL FOR FIGHTING JAIL EXPANSIONS: PREDICTIVE
DATA CAN SUPPORT OLMSTEAD LITIGATION
For communities organizing to prevent construction of a county “mental
health jail,” Olmstead can provide a powerful legal tool. The Fourth Circuit made
clear that an Olmstead claim is not limited to instances of actual institutionalization;

149. Id. at 1.
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 5–11.
153. CORP. FOR SUPPORTIVE HOUS., SUPPORTIVE HOUSING & O LMSTEAD , THE DIALOGUE
1 (2016), https://www.csh.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/olmstead-2016.pdf [ https://perma.cc/
JRQ8-B6E2 ].
154. Id.
155. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. B (1998).
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instead, it protects those facing a “risk of institutionalization.”156 The DOJ issued a
determination that the ADA and the Olmstead decision “extend to persons at
serious risk of institutionalization or segregation and are not limited to individuals
currently in institutional or other segregated settings.”157 The Tenth Circuit similarly
held that the ADA’s “protections would be meaningless if plaintiffs were required
to segregate themselves by entering an institution before they could challenge an
allegedly discriminatory law or policy that threatens to force them into
segregated isolation.”158
Any person who is living in the community with unmet mental health needs,
including medication, mental-health treatment, housing, peer support, case-worker
support, assisted employment, and other services, and is not receiving services is at
increased risk of interaction with law enforcement. Any person facing this risk could
be a part of a plaintiff class with a cognizable Olmstead claim. This would be true
even if they are not currently incarcerated and even though they cannot prove with
certainty that they will be incarcerated in a proposed “mental health jail.” The
extreme risk of such incarceration, when community alternatives that could prevent
segregation are not being provided, would give them an ADA right to challenge the
jail expansion.
VI. SOLUTIONS THROUGH INTEGRATION OF LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL
ADVOCACY
The decades of organizing and activism by community advocates working to
expand alternatives to incarceration cannot succeed without broader systemic
support. Ultimately, money has to be appropriated, and counties have to shift their
focus from incarceration to treatment. In many cases, this involves moving
intractable political players and sheriff’s departments invested in maintaining and
expanding their budgets.
Olmstead litigation could act as a supporting effort to promote the goals of
community activism. Often, the threat of a lawsuit provides leverage that
community organizations do not have alone. Successful settlements can bypass slow
political progress and force counties to move more quickly. We owe it to our
communities to protect our neighbors, to keep them home, and to provide the
integrated care necessary to living successfully with a disability. This is not only a
moral duty but also a legal one, and it is an investment in our communities. It is an
economic justice, racial justice, and disability justice issue. People who are caught in
the system cycle through it, facing homelessness, hospitalization, and
reincarceration. People who receive integrated care in their community are more
likely to become stable, less likely to cause harm, and more able to give back to their
156. Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 322 (4th Cir. 2013).
157. C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 61.
158. Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Steimel
v. Wernert, 823 F.3d 902, 912 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that protection is not limited to those who are
already institutionalized).
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community.159 Communities must “assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency” for everyone,
regardless of disability.160

159. CTR. FOR HEALTH & JUST. AT TASC, NO ENTRY: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DIVERSION PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES 4 (2013), https://
www.centerforhealthandjustice.org/tascblog/Images/documents/Publications/CHJ%20Diversion%
20Report_web.pdf [ https://perma.cc/74YY-UHA8 ] (“[A]mong people with mental health problems
in state prisons and local jails, 74 percent and 76 percent, respectively, also have substance use
disorders.”); JOHN ROMAN, WENDY TOWNSEND & AVINASH SINGH BHATI, CALIBER
ASSOCS. & THE URB. INST., RECIDIVISM RATES FOR DRUG COURT GRADUATES: NATIONALLY
BASED ESTIMATES, FINAL REPORT ( 2003), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/201229.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/MH2P-26CM ] (finding that recidivism rates for graduates of drug courts were
significantly lower than recidivism rates for people sentenced to jail or prison in meta-analysis of studies
across the United States).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
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